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Abstract 
Extractive transnational corporations (ETC) can cause environmental harm 
and commit human rights (HHRRs) abuses in developing countries (DC). 
However, holding them accountable can become a real issue for their 
victims. There are different cases to reflect on this problem, but the one 
facing Ecuadorian communities against Chevron Corporation over oil 
pollution and HHRRs violations it’s turning twenty-four years old, bringing 
us important lessons on corporate impunity. After reviewing the way this 
case has developed, it becomes clear that states, international 
organizations, and civil society involvement is necessary; that corporate 
responsibility should be regulated at all levels (national and international); 
and that durable coalitions’ support from civil society organizations is 
fundamental to address the problem of ETCs causing environmental harm 
and committing HHRRs abuses in DC. 
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Resumo 
As corporações transnacionais extrativas (ETC) podem causar danos 
ambientais e cometer violações de direitos humanos (HHRRs) em países em 
desenvolvimento (DC). No entanto, responsabilizá-las pode se tornar uma 
real dificuldade para as vítimas. Existem diferentes casos para refletir sobre 
esse problema, mas o que enfrenta as comunidades equatorianas contra a 
Chevron Corporation em relação à poluição por hidrocarbonetos e às 
violações de direitos humanos (HHRRs) está fazendo vinte e quatro anos, 
trazendo-nos importantes lições sobre a impunidade das empresas. Depois 
de analisar a forma como esse caso se desenvolveu, fica claro que o 
envolvimento dos Estados, das organizações internacionais e da sociedade 
civil são necessários; que a responsabilidade corporativa deve ser regulada 
em todos os níveis (nacional e internacional); e que o apoio durável das 
coalizões das organizações da sociedade civil é fundamental para abordar o 
problema das corporações transnacionais extrativas (ETCs) causando danos 
ambientais e cometendo abusos de direitos humanos (HHRRs) em países 
em desenvolvimento. 
 
Palavras-chave 
Justiça ambiental. Obrigações vinculantes. Tratado internacional. 
Responsabilidade corporativa. Direitos humanos. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A binding treaty on corporate responsability: a global solution to address the problem of corporate impunity – 
lessons learned from Aguinda vs Chevron 
2 
 
Homa Publica - Revista Internacional de Direitos Humanos e Empresas | 2526-0774 | Vol. 01 Nº 02 | Jan-Jun 2017 | e:019 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Extractive transnational corporations (ETC) can cause environmental harm and commit 
human rights (HHRRs) abuses in developing countries (DC). However, holding them accountable can 
become a real issue for their victims. There are different cases to reflect on this problem, but the one 
facing Ecuadorian communities against Chevron Corporation over oil pollution and HHRRs violations 
it’s turning twenty-four years old, bringing us important lessons on corporate impunity. This story is 
a clear reflection of the struggle required to hold an ETC accountable for wrongdoings in DCs. 
Therefore, the case against Chevron can be considered as a case study on how to prevent ETC’s 
impunity and bring access to justice for their victims. 
During the past 24 years, Ecuadorians had fought their claims against Chevron under many 
different jurisdictions and at all levels. Starting in the USA (1993), the case was sent back to Ecuador 
at Chevron’s request (2002), just to return to New York two decades later. After losing at all Court 
levels in Ecuador, Chevron refused to pay and decided to challenge the final judgment as the product 
of a fraud. Chevron claimed that the Ecuadorian Judiciary System was completely corrupted and 
initiated a international arbitration claim against the Ecuadorian Government. At the same time, a 
racketeering civil lawsuit was brought against the Ecuadorians victims (and their representatives), 
precisely in New York. Meanwhile, the Ecuadorians turned to different jurisdictions: The International 
Criminal Court—to try to hold accountable Chevron’s CEO-; the Argentinian, Brazilian and Canadian 
courts—looking to enforce their judgment against Chevron’s assets, after the company refused to 
pay and fled Ecuador; and to the Inter-American Human Rights System—seeking to prevent the 
Ecuadorian Government from interfering with the judicial proceedings.  
After reviewing the way this case has developed, it becomes clear that enforcing an 
international instrument on corporate liability is the best way to address the problem of ETCs causing 
environmental harm and committing HHRRs abuses in DC. Although there are many initiatives 
ongoing toward corporate liability, the most suitable way to coordinate different levels of regulations 
and the variety of stakeholders, is by looking at their efficacy towards enforcement of environmental 
and human rights obligations – beyond efficacy imposing regulations.   
Some stakeholders’ efforts opposing this option are very prominent, but those who oppose 
are the same ones benefiting from the status quo: Social Corporate Responsibility. Thus, we can agree 
in three things: First, the regulatory initiative should drift separate from corporations’ pressure. This 
means that states, international organizations, and civil society should be involved – in a coordinated 
matter – to hold ETCs accountable. Second, corporate responsibility should be regulated at all levels 
(national and international), but we find international level to be critical for coordination. And third, 
durable coalitions support is fundamental to address this super wicked problem. States and civil 
society organizations concerned with this problem should work as an epistemic community and 
gather forces for the same policy claim.    
2. ETCS DOING BUSINESS IN DCS 
Companies from developed countries have succeeded in globalizing their operations, mostly 
to developing countries. Extractive Transnational Corporations (ETC) are on the top of the list 
because -among other historical reasons- the resources are frequently allocated in DCs. However, 
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when operating in these countries, corporations might provoke harm to local people and the 
environment in which they rely on. Some authors have suggested that “Companies, acting alone or in 
complicity with states, pose a real threat of violating a wide range of civil, political, social, economic 
and cultural human rights in diverse ways” (DEVA, 2012, p. 3). Even though environmental and social 
harm may also occur in the companies’ homelands, cases were harm occur elsewhere might be treated 
and solved very differently. 
In 2010, when the  British Petroleum (BP) caused the spill in the Mexican Gulf, people -even 
the White House-1 rushed to point fingers, and Courts were very efficient to calculate the damage 
and to condemn the company to pay billions of dollars.2 This is to not say that in this case the spill 
problems have been properly addressed (from the social or environmental point of view), but that BP 
(and others) had no place to run or hide his liability – the judicial system was very effective.  However, 
the story might be different when a disaster occurs in a DC, as happened with Maria Aguinda and 
other Ecuadorian citizens trying to get Chevron accountable for 24 years. The Aguinda vs. Chevron 
case led us to think that many years of highly expensive and complex litigation is required, without 
any warranty of success.  
The efforts to regulate ETCs liability are nothing new in history. To the contrary, political 
struggle has been going on for decades: Corporations enjoy a weakness bias constructed since 
colonial times by developed countries (CASTILLO, 2013, p. 10). However, after independence was 
achieved by DCs the situation persisted. Moreover, new trade conditions brought international work 
divisions among exporters and importers, leaving resource extraction to ETCs. (DE RIVERO, 1980, p.1). 
This bias assumed that, in State-Corporations relationships, corporations were the weak part – and 
therefore deserve protection (CASTILLO, 2013, p. 11). At the New Economic International Order, 
developing countries were pushing towards a Code of Conduct for Transnational Corporations, but 
they failed. In its place, mechanisms to protect international investments were enacted, reinforcing 
the bias in favor for corporations.  
As other authors have pointed out “Globalization of the world economy and trade, especially 
under the umbrella of the World Trade Organization, has played its part in changing the dynamics of 
human rights and also posed new challenges for their relations” (DEVA, 2012, p. 3). But it is more 
appropriate to say that victims of corporate abuses have been left without an appropriated 
mechanism to address their claims (KENNEDY, 2006, p. 113-114). 
2.1  B IAS AND L IMITATIONS  
On the one hand, it must be recognized that not all ETCs operating abroad engage in 
environmental and/or HHRRs violations. But on the other hand, it must be acknowledged that when 
they do (as in the Chevron case), there are no international legal binding obligations (or forum) to 
hold them accountable. Their victims (usually disadvantaged people from DCs) are regularly impotent 
                                                                
1 The White House took a very strong stand on this issue: “So let’s be clear about a few things: BP is responsible for -- and will 
be held accountable for – all of the very significant clean-up and containment costs. They will pay for the mess they’ve made.” 
See <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2010/05/04/holding-bp-accountable>.  
2 Kathleen Gould, for instance, has pointed out how serious this case was taken by the judiciary: “This 153-page decision issued 
by Judge Barbier is an example of proper procedure; all the evidence was presented and investigated and a decision was made 
that addressed the negligence of the company and sufficiently compensated affected areas.” See: Gould, Kathleen, "Oil in 
Ecuador: The Traps of Transnational Capitalism", Senior Capstone Projects, Paper 450, 2015. 
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against complex corporative legal structures, highly expensive international litigation, secrecy, and 
inefficient judicial systems. Therefore, beyond recognizing that some corporations might be 
respectful with HHRRs and the environment, (and that not all victims are powerless), this article starts 
assuming these conditions as a wicked problem. Consequently, the necessity to address this problem 
in some way is critical.   
3. A PARADIGMATIC CASE 
Texaco Petroleum Company (a wholly owned subsidiary of Chevron Corporation)3 extracted 
oil from the eastern region of Ecuador. Since 1963 until 1992 Chevron drilled more than 360 oil wells 
and dogged around 900 pits for toxic waste. More than 400.000 Hectares in two Ecuadorian provinces 
were affected. These lands were the homeland for seven indigenous nationalities – two of them 
already disappeared – and for dozens of farmers’ communities4 (CORTE NACIONAL DE JUSTICIA, 
CASACIÓN, No. 174 2012, February 14th, 2011, p. 147).   
Oil extraction operations produced more than 16 billion gallons of produced water, which 
were disposed into the rivers. Millions of metric tons of natural gas were flared and drilled muds were 
(and remain) buried into the ground and covered with soil and vegetation. Flora and fauna have been 
affected by the pollution, causing a great disturbance in traditional cultures way of living (CORTE 
NACIONAL DE JUSTICIA, CASACIÓN, No. 174-2012, February 14th, 2011).   
 Ecuadorian affected communities sued Chevron Corporation for environmental damages 
that polluted more than 400.000 hectares of (once) pristine rainforest. The trial started in 1993, in 
New York, and took more than 20 years until reaching a final decision by Ecuadorian National Court 
(the jurisdiction chosen by Chevron). The Ecuadorians were awarded a 9,6 billion dollars’ 
compensation, which are -by court orders- to be invested in restoring the polluted environment and 
other related damages. (CORTE NACIONAL DE JUSTICIA, CASACIÓN, No. 174-2012, February 14th, 
2011).  
The judicial case facing Ecuadorian communities against Chevron Corporation over oil 
pollution and other related damages it’s turning twenty-four years old. During this years, Ecuadorians 
had fought their claims under many different jurisdictions, at all levels. Starting in 1993 in the USA, 
the case was sent back to Ecuador at Chevron’s request (2002),5 just to return to New York two 
decades later. After being condemned at all Court levels in Ecuador, Chevron decided to challenge 
the judgment as the product of a fraud and claimed that the Ecuadorian Judiciary System as 
completely corrupt.   
Chevron promised a “lifetime of appellate and collateral litigation” and vowed to “fight it out 
until hell freezes over, and then fight it out on the ice.”6  Accordingly the company initiated a 
                                                                
3 The Federal Trade Commission Consent Agreement allowed the merger of Chevron Corp. and Texaco Inc., in 7 September 
2001. 
4 For a copy of the judgment and appeals decisions, in both Spanish and English, as well as an English summary of the judgment’s 
findings, see <http://chevrontoxico.com/news-and-multimedia/2011/0406-key-documents-and-court-filings-from-aguinda-
legal-team.html>.  
5 US Court of Appeals Second Circuit, Aguinda v Texaco Inc., 16 August 2002, at: 
<http://ftp.resource.org/courts.gov/c/F3/303/303.F3d.470.01-7758.01-7756.html>. Access: August 13th, 2011.  
6 Alexander Zaitchik, “Sludge Match: Inside Chevron’s $9 Billion Legal Battle With Ecuadorean Villagers, Rolling Stone”, Rolling 
Stones Magazine, Aug. 28, 2014, <http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/sludge-match-chevron-legal-battle-ecuador-
steven-donziger-20140828>. Access: February 25th, 2017.  
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commercial arbitration case against the Ecuadorian Government, and at the same time, a racketeering 
civil lawsuit against the Ecuadorians victims. The arbitration was brought under the UNCITRAL rules, 
claiming that Ecuador was breaching a contract by allowing Ecuadorian citizens to sue Chevron. 
Meanwhile, a civil fraud case was filed against Ecuadorians plaintiffs in New York, claiming that they 
were a criminal organization—trying to extort money from Chevron over false environmental liability 
claims.    
The Ecuadorians plaintiffs also did their part to keep the case moving forward. After Chevron 
refused to pay and fled from Ecuador, the plaintiffs started seeking to enforce the judgment abroad. 
Chevron’s assets in Brazil, Argentina and Canada were targeted for recognition and enforcement of 
the judgement. Many years and resources have been invested into these proceedings, yet the 
outcome is still pending in all of them. Complex corporate structures make it very challenging because 
Chevron (as others ETCs) carries on its business through many layers of subsidiary companies in 
different countries.   
After the arbitration Court issued an interim order commanding the Ecuadorian Government 
to take any necessary measures to avoid the Ecuadorian case to move forward in Ecuadorian Courts, 
the plaintiffs sent a petition to the Inter-American Human Rights Commission (IHRC). The plaintiffs 
wanted the IHRC to intervene in the case Ecuadorian Courts would comply with the arbitration Court’s 
request. The petition was withdrawn because a remarkable decision issued by Ecuadorian Courts 
made it unnecessary:    
The case in question is not simply about the obligations of the Ecuadorian State under 
International Law, there is also a potential conflict between supranational norms: on the 
one hand, the binding force of arbitral awards to the Ecuadorian State (in terms of 
Investments), and, on the other hand, the effective validity of Human Rights. […] Thus, since 
Ecuador is a party to [the American Human Rights Convention], and we are faced with a 
binding and enforceable norm, and recognizing that the arbitration award is based on 
international norms created for the purpose of protecting investments, we find no 
justification to make the arbitral award trump our existing human rights obligations. (STATE 
COURT OF SUCUMBIOS, No. 21 101-201 1-0106, February 17th, 2017 – free translation) 
The Ecuadorian plaintiffs also filed a communication at the International Criminal Court, 
claiming that Chevron’s CEO, John Watson, has criminal liability for refusing to comply with court 
orders to clean up – thereby, forcing Ecuadorians to live in- an oil polluted environment. Despite the 
evidence on Watson’s personal interest and harmful decisions,7 the Prosecutor refrain from opening 
an investigation.  
4. THE NECESSITY TO ADRESS ENVIRONMENTAL AND HHRRS 
VIOLATIONS COMMITTED BY ETC 
As the problem of ETC crimes is back in the international political agenda,8 several States and 
civil organizations are arguing that this issue can be addressed implementing an international binding 
                                                                
7 Watson is responsible for Chevron acquiring Texaco while the case (and risk) was pending. Any harm to Chevron’s shareholders 
would be his responsibility. According to Chevron’s web page: “In 2000, he led the company’s integration effort following the 
Chevron-Texaco merger and then became the corporation’s chief financial officer. See: 
<https://www.chevron.com/about/leadership/john-watson>.  
8 Business & Human Rights Resource Centre, “Binding Treaty”, <https://business-humanrights.org/en/binding-treaty>. Access: 
February 24th, 2017.   
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regulations to address Environmental and HHRRs violations committed by ETC.9  Victims from 
different DCs are gathering together, helping to support this claim with their own experiences. In 
fact, the need for an international instrument containing binding obligations for transnational 
corporations has become evident precisely because of cases just like Chevron against Ecuadorians.10  
Ecuador and South Africa proposed a resolution in Geneva, at the 26th session of the UN HHRRs 
Council. This proposal achieved the creation of a Working Group, but also empowered social 
organizations and people, all over the globe, to support and influence this process. The initiative is 
getting much attention, especially since the European Union seems inclined towards this proposal, 
whit 62 votes in favor, 5 against, and only 1 abstention. (CORRAO, 2016, p.13)  
It can be said that this is the point where an epistemic community is gathering forces. Deva 
has argued that “There is a broad consensus that it is important to agree on the human rights 
responsibilities of companies at the international level” (DEVA, 2012, p.202). Moreover, it is becoming 
apparent that there is an agreement among people working on this problem over some of the most 
urgent threats emerging from this lack of regulation. Lambooy has argued that “Various legal, 
practical and procedural barriers can prevent effective justice in business-related human rights abuse 
cases” (LAMBOOY 2011 p.6). Many of them can be identified using the Chevron legal warfare as a case 
study:   
 ETCs operating abroad could deploy obsolete environmental standards and technology, like 
it happened in Ecuador. Suzana Sawyer has described that Chevron deployed practices that 
"boosted revenues by the billions” and that “Texaco employed minimal equipment, 
outmoded technology, and cheap labor” (GOULD, 2015, p. 17). She also remarked that this 
company “with over fifty years of experience, had control over operations and deliberately 
used dangerous protocol to cut costs, knowing that in the depths of the Amazon they would 
get away with it. (SAWYER, 2004, p.100)”. As a result, negative environmental externalities 
that must be avoided are permitted to happen in DCs – while corporation revenue grows in 
an inversely proportional way.   
 Organizational structures are designed to keep liability away from the capital. As Deva has 
pointed out, ETCs operate today across the globe through a complex web of subsidiaries and 
affiliate concerns. (DEVA, 2012, p.50). Even if individuals manage to win a litigious case 
against an ETC, collecting from a corporation may be very difficult due to the corporate veil 
and complex corporative structures. The Ecuadorian case is the perfect example of this. 
Indeed, transnational corporations make it very hard to become regulatory targets because 
“There are no limits on how transnational corporations can structure their operations through 
a web of parent, subsidiary and affiliate sister concerns” (DEVA, 2012, p.50).  Moreover, 
previous attempts to regulate abroad activities of ETC have already failed in Australia, United 
Kingdom and United States (DEVA, 2012, p.51). Even after the Ecuadorian plaintiffs 
                                                                
9For more information about the efforts of several non-governmental organizations to create a international binding treaty 
see: <http://www.treatymovement.com>; <https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/binding-treaty>; 
<http://www.stopcorporateimpunity.org/global-movement-for-a-binding-treaty>; <http://www.foei.org/what-we-
do/towards-binding-treaty-transnational-corporations-human-rights>;<https://www.tni.org/en/publication/8-proposals-for-
the-binding-treaty-on-transnational-corporations-and-human-rights>.  
10 For information about other cases see: Trumbo, Sol, Enfrentando los crímenes impunes de las empresas transnacionales, at 
<http://blogs.publico.es/dominiopublico/17745/enfrentando-los-crimenes-impunes-de-las-empresas-transnacionales/>.  
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succeeded seizing Chevron’s assets in Argentina at trial level and also on appellate Courts, 
the decision was reversed by the Supreme Court, arguing that Chevron Argentina is a 
completely different legal person from Chevron Corporation. (SUPREME COURT OF 
ARGENTINA, RECURSO DE HECHO, A.523. XLIX, A.238. XLIX, June 4th, 2013). Canadians Courts 
ruled in a similar manner, rejecting Ecuadorians efforts because a judgement against Chevron 
Corporation could not be enforced against Chevron Canada.11 (ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT 
DECISION, 2017 ONSC 135, January 20th, 2017).  
 ETCs can use the standard defenses regarding a foreign country judgment recognition in 
order to avoid liability abroad. After the trial is sent abroad (because the ETC claims forum-
non-convenience, as Chevron did in NY), the ETC can start tailoring the foreign litigation to 
satisfy one of the exceptions to avoid its recognition. (WESTON, 2017, p. 736) As a result, 
“claimants face a denial of justice in a host State and cannot access home State courts 
regardless of the merits of the claim” (TINEKE, 2011, p. 6). 
 Citizens from DCs could “experience difficulty in securing legal representation, due to a lack 
of resources or of other incentives for lawyers to advise claimants in this area” (TINEKE, 2011, 
p.6). ETCs enjoy virtually unlimited resources for litigation, while their victims, in most cases, 
can hardly afford a lawyer. This situation may give corporations an incentive to prolong (and 
multiply) litigations to outsource their adversaries, just as happens with Chevron, who 
promised “a lifetime of appellate and collateral litigation” and vowed to “fight it out until hell 
freezes over, and then fight it out on the ice.”12 This consumes the victims’ money, but is also 
highly expensive to judicial systems – taxpayers money wasted in frivolous judicial 
proceedings. The costs of bringing claims go beyond being an appropriate deterrent to 
unmeritorious cases and/or cannot be reduced to reasonable levels through government 
support, ‘market-based’ mechanisms (such as litigation insurance and legal fee structures), or 
other means. (TINEKE, 2011, p. 6).  
 ETCs agreements with governments are often secret or confidential: victims are not allowed 
to access crucial information to address their claims and prove them to be true. Even their 
ability to understand the problem is frustrated without the necessary information. For 
example, the agreement between Chevron and the Argentinian Government (to explore and 
exploit the Vaca Muerta shale formation in Neuquén) remains secret, even after the Supreme 
Court ordered to release it.13 The agreement contains the details about their business and 
financial structure14, which is critical information to enforce obligations. 
                                                                
11 On corporate separateness, Jack Coop, from Fogler Rubinoff, explains that: “The court accepted that, on all the evidence, 
the two corporations are  separate  legal  entities,  and  declined  to  pierce  the  corporate  veil  to  permit  enforcement  against 
the subsidiary. In fact, the court took the unusual step of repeating and adopting all of the  findings  of  fact  of  the  original  
Superior  Court  decision  that  was  appealed  to  the  Supreme Court.”  
<http://foglers.com/uploads/press/file/407/Energy_Environmental_Feb8.pdf>. Access: February 10th, 2017. 
12 Alexander Zaitchik, “Sludge Match: Inside Chevron’s $9 Billion Legal Battle With Ecuadorean Villagers”, Rolling Stone, Aug. 
28, 2014, <http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/sludge-match-chevron-legal-battle-ecuador-steven-donziger-
20140828>. Access: February 17th, 2017. 
13 Reuters, “Argentina's Supreme Court orders YPF to disclose Chevron contract”, November 10th, 2015, 
<http://www.reuters.com/article/argentina-ypf-chevron-idUSL1N1351GG20151110>. Access: February 17th, 2017.  
14 The Buenos Aires Herald wrote: “According to sources close to the firm, the “complex structure” of the contract signed with 
Chevron was aimed at “guaranteeing the flow of investment” from the US company, which was at the time facing a lawsuit in 
Ecuador. Argentina, meanwhile, was under pressure from both Spain’s Repsol — whose shares in YPF were nationalized by the 
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 Investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) is available for ETCs and States to solve differences 
secretly and privately. Victims are not allowed to be a party to these proceedings, and Arbitral 
orders don’t consider HHRRs as part of their binding body of law. Statistically speaking, ISDS 
resolves seven of each ten cases in favor companies,15 which could become a way to achieve 
corporate impunity. According to the company: “Chevron filed the international arbitration 
claim against the government of Ecuador on September 23, 2009, claiming violations of 
Ecuador’s obligations under the United States-Ecuador Bilateral Investment Treaty, 
investment agreements, and international law”.16 An interim award ordered that the 
Government of Ecuador “has to take all measures at its disposal to suspend or cause to be 
suspended the enforcement or recognition within and without Ecuador of any judgment 
against the (Chevron) in the Lago Agrio Case”. (PCA, Case No. 2009-23, February 27th, 2012). 
Chevron claimed that the Ecuadorian courts handling the Lago Agrio case had violated 
Chevron’s due process rights because the Lago Agrio litigation had violated the settlement 
agreement of 1995 between the Ecuadorian government and Texaco. 
 After demanding justice from ETCs, victims and their representatives might be targeted with 
retaliatory and dissuasive tactics. “The use of ‘strategic litigation against public participation’ 
(SLAPP) lawsuits silences [Environmental Human Rights Defenders], effectively denying them 
both their rights to freedom of expression and participation in public affairs. EHRDs require 
support in their defense against such lawsuits, the financial and psychological burdens of 
which are often so great that they distract and demobilize defenders”.17  In 2011, Chevron 
filed a lawsuit under the US Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act against the 
Ecuadorian plaintiffs, their lawyers and representatives. (SOUTHERN DISTRICT COURT OF 
NEW YORK, No. 11 civ 0691, February 1st, 2011). The outcome of this case prevent the 
plaintiffs from trying to enforce their judgment against Chevron in USA. (2nd CIRCUIT, NEW 
YORK, 833 F.3d 74, 2016). 
 In other cases, States and ETCs might share interests, leaving victims without an impartial 
local jurisdiction to solve their claims. According to Le Billon, “private and public economic 
and strategic interests are protected by state apparatus (for example, corrupt interests of 
state officials, protection of multinational corporations, access to strategic commodities such 
as oil, international political alliances) (LE BILLON, 2003, p. 275).  Justice administration in DCs 
may become biased by these interests, leaving victims without access to justice. 
Other issues can be identified beyond these barriers. First, we have the self- regulatory 
regime of Corporate Social Responsibility, and second, the complexity of having many stakeholders 
involved. 
                                                                
Cristina Fernández de Kirchner government in 2012 — and the so-called “vulture” funds suing the country in New York.” See: 
<http://buenosairesherald.com/article/221895/ypf%E2%80%99s-chevron-contract-to-be-handed-in-today>.  
15 Acevedo, Jose Manuel, “Arbitros  fueron sin decir adiós”, Semana, February 10, 2017, 
<http://www.semana.com/opinion/articulo/jose-manuel-acevedo-arbitros-se-fueron-sin-decir-adios/515101>. Access: 
February 17th, 2017.  
16 Retrieved at: <https://www.chevron.com/stories/international-arbitration-tribunal-finds-chevron-not-liable-for-
environmental-claims-in-ecuador>. Access: February, 9th, 2017. 
17 United Nations, “They Spoke Truth To Power And Were Murdered In Cold Blood” (adaptation of the official report A/71/281), 
United Nations Special Rapporteur on The Situation Of Human Rights Defenders, 2016, p. 32, at <https://goo.gl/r8G8Bg>. Access: 
February 14th, 2017.    
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4.1  THE SELF-REGULATION FALLACY  
The Ruggie’s Principles18  where endorsed  by the United Nations Human Rights Council on 
June 6th, 2011, setting a “new set of global guiding principles for business designed to ensure that 
companies do not violate human rights in the course of the their transactions and that they provide 
redress when infringements occur”.19 This is the regime in place, or status quo on corporate 
responsibility on HHRRs. There are many supporters to this, and strongly opposing the work of the 
intergovernmental United Nations Human Rights Commission work group on a corporate liability 
binding treaty (UN Resolution A/HRC/RES/26/9).20 This might be due to failing in recognizing that 
there is a problem, or misattributing its necessary relevance.  
Whichever the cause is, maintaining self-regulatory systems seems to be not enough for 
victims of corporate abuse. This self-regulatory system has been broadly criticized precisely because 
of their lack of effectiveness to address the problem of corporate abuse. As stated by Deva, “the 
existing regulatory initiatives miserably fail to respond to key conceptual (the principle of separate 
legal personality) and procedural (the doctrine of forum non conveniens) hurdles faced by victims in 
holding companies accountable for human rights abuses”. (DEVA, 2012, p.117).  The voluntary UN 
norms fail to “offer any insights on how to overcome the challenges posed by the corporate misuse 
of the doctrine of forum non conveniens and the principle of separate legal personality to delay or 
avoid their liability for human rights abuses” (DEVA, 2012, p.104). Thus, it’s becoming clear that 
maintaining the status quo (meaning that no further action is taken to address the problem) does not 
very little from ETC’s victims point of view. 
Therefore, maintaining the status quo is more likely to perpetuate the problems of 
Environmental and HHRRs violations committed by ETC operating abroad. Precisely, the status quo -
the self-regulatory approach- is what allows transnational corporations to do business safely – 
meaning to work worldwide virtually free of any liability. There are thousands of legally binding 
agreements to protect companies transnational investments,21 but none to make them accountable 
for their actions regarding human rights violations abroad. Moreover, corporations rely on very 
complex legal and financial schemes to keep their assets hidden to their victims – and tax agencies. 
These are just a few gears for a global system, known and criticized as the architecture of impunity, 
revealing the tendency to shift from “the Ruggie’s Peace”, or the status quo of corporate 
responsibility (BERRON, 2014, p.125). 
 
 
 
                                                                
18 The "Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ 
Framework", known as Ruggie’s Principles, were developed by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to address 
human rights and transnational corporations. The Human Rights Council endorsed the Guiding Principles in its resolution 17/4, 
of 16 June 2011. 
19 See: <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=38742#.WLt3UH_5q-4>. Access: December 15th, 2016.  
20 For more information about United States, European Union and Japan strongly opposing the innititative – and Brazil 
abstention, see: Trumbo, Sol. Enfrentando los Crímenes Impunes de las Empresas Transnacionales. At: 
<http://blogs.publico.es/dominiopublico/17745/enfrentando-los-crimenes-impunes-de-las-empresas-transnacionales/>. 
Access: January 9th, 2017. 
21 The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development HUB web page states that there are 2329 Bilateral Investment 
Treaties enforced. See: <http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA>. Access: February 18, 2017. 
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4.2  THE MANY STAKEHOLDERS ’  PROBLEM  
As we just saw, the complex problem of international corporate liability involves many 
challenges. One of them is the variety and quantity of stakeholders involved: Citizens from 
developing countries—in many cases indigenous groups-, developing and developed countries, 
International Organizations, environmental and HHRRs organizations, corporations, scholars, and the 
international community. 
Decades of corporate abuse has led to the creation of an epistemic community claiming the 
necessity to regulate international corporate liability. In fact, the problem is that there is no central 
authority capable of regulating the international activities of transnational corporations, nor is one 
capable of enforcing those regulations. It seems like those causing the problem (corporations and 
developed countries) are also trying to solve the problem – on their own way: assuming that business 
needs protection from developing countries and that any regulation should be of voluntary 
compliance. 
5. SETTING THE GOALS FOR A BINDING TREATY 
The problem of HHRRs and environmental crimes committed by ETCs in DCs can be seen 
under different perspectives, depending on what is the goal a legal binding treaty is aiming to reach. 
To facilitate this analysis, goals can be divided into substantives and instrumental. For this case, 
substantive goals are consistent with the three pillars of sustainability: environmental, social and 
economic goals. The instrumental goal is related to efficiency by looking at different costs and 
revenues. We will analyze each one briefly. 
Environmental Goal: Reduce (and prevent) environmental damage caused by ETCs in DCs. - As 
explained above, ETCs generally deploy different environmental standards and technology when 
operating abroad. By doing so, corporations obtain higher revenues because their operations costs 
are reduced. However, this cost reduction is proportionally reflected by negative environmental 
externalities arising from this way of operating. The first goal would be then to reduce these harmful 
environmental impacts.  
Social Goal:  Reduce impacts on HHRRs of local population affected by corporations’ activities. - 
HHRRs are intrinsically related to the environment, especially in developing countries. Developing 
countries’ population often relies heavily on the environment for their own survival. This was the case 
of Ecuadorian indigenous people affected by Chevron pollution. As a result, if pollution occurs, 
people’s health, dignity and live are affected. 
Economic Goal: Reduce economic harm and inequity caused by corporations operating abroad. 
Negatives externalities caused by corporations operating abroad enhances inequities among nations 
and people. This inequity harms developing countries’ economies but also has effects on the local 
population because the means to survive frequently depends on a healthy environment. Thus, 
polluted environments become a barrier to economic development. 
Efficiency Goal:  Improve cost benefit outcome. -The lack of an international binding norms to 
address corporate responsibility is highly expensive to many stakeholders. Endless litigation requires 
many resources, not only from parties involved but from judicial systems. These expenses could be 
reduced and environmental protection achieved by regulating corporate responsibility. Besides, 
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higher surplus for a few is not enough to compensate for the burden on society, especially because 
the surplus and the costs are allocated in different parts of the world.  
6. CONSIDERATION OF OTHER OPTIONS 
The necessity for and international instrument has already been stated above, but what other 
options do we have? and more importantly, what should we expect from this legal instrument? In 
order to corroborate this statement and answer these questions, an evaluation must be conducted, 
considering the different options, their advantages and disadvantages. From there, we can identify 
the key conditions which most likely would be helpful into reaching the goals mentioned above. 
There are different options to address the problem of corporations and their harmful 
practices in developing countries. Some organizations are framing this problem as the lack of an 
international binding treaty to address environmental and HHRRs violations committed by ETCs 
operating on DCs.22 Others are advocating to reform the Rome Statute to include ecocide as a crime 
against humanity - and/or the creation of a specialized chamber at the International Criminal Court.23 
Business enthusiasts, on the other hand, are lobbying to maintain the status quo, arguing that current 
voluntary regulations are working just fine – for business.24  Considering all these differences, the 
options available can be classified as follows: 1.Maintaining the status quo (self-regulation); 2. 
Achieving implementation of national regulations at multiple States; 3.Creating a set of international 
binding obligations/rules. 4. A mixture of tools, at local and international level. 
6.1  THE STATUS QUO  
As stated above, maintaining the status quo means that no action is taken to address the 
problem, and maintaining the architecture of impunity – or the status quo of corporate responsibility.     
The advantage of maintaining status quo is allowing corporations being able to rise their 
profits while working in developing countries. It could also bring investments to certain parts of the 
globe because the financial risk of doing business is reduced. The disadvantages of maintaining the 
status quo are perpetuating or increasing environment and HHRR’s violations; but also, this is likely 
to cause a lack of trust in the judicial systems ability to solve their claims. The problem will not be 
solved by itself. As the problem grows, it will be impossible to hide it from the public opinion. 
Still, this is not a suggestion in the sense that voluntary regulations are to be abandoned. This 
kind of initiative doesn’t harm goals achievement, but keeping it as the one and only regulation upon 
corporations will certainly perpetuate the problem.  
6.2  IMPLEMENTATION OF NATIONAL LEGISLATION  
States are entitled to legislate locally to prevent the problem of harm caused by transnational 
corporations in their territories. Every State could enact mandatory regulations for business, 
                                                                
22 For the efforts regarding this option see: http://www.treatymovement.com/; https://www.business-
humanrights.org/en/binding-treaty; http://www.stopcorporateimpunity.org/global-movement-for-a-binding-treaty; 
http://www.foei.org/what-we-do/towards-binding-treaty-transnational-corporations-human-rights; 
https://www.tni.org/en/publication/8-proposals-for-the-binding-treaty-on-transnational-corporations-and-human-rights  
23 Further information about this kind of initiatives see: http://stopecocide.nl/en/ and http://eradicatingecocide.com/  
24 For lobbing practices on this matter see: http://www.conectas.org/en/actions/sur-journal/issue/20/1007275-economic-
power-democracy-and-human-rights-a-new-international-debate-on-human-rights-and-corporations  
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including environmental and HHRRs standards for their activities. Depending on their perception of 
the problem and its urgency, States may face this issue with different approaches. However, to 
regulate and improve corporate practices, States should legislate at least on the following policy 
options: 
 Corporate veil piercing. The corporate veil is a legal protection that separates corporations’ 
personalities from their subsidiaries and shareholders. This means that they are legally 
different persons and that one cannot be held liable for the others actions. However, States 
can legislate and create legal mechanisms to pierce the corporate veil. Piercing the corporate 
veil means rendering it useless to assume legal separateness among different entities, 
exclusively when it’s used to hide assets and/or avoid liability. This is not a proposal to 
eliminate the corporate veil –it is understandable that it is also a tool to do business safely. 
The purpose is rather to coordinate the creation of national regulations to avoid corporations 
from abusing the corporate veil to evade liability. Some States already have provisions 
regulating this piercing. In most cases, it is required to demonstrate the intention to commit 
fraud, while in others a strong link among the two entities must be provided. 
  Transparency and public access to information. Many States already have regulations to 
address public disclosure of information, but other States are well known as tax heavens 
because of their flexibility towards corporative interests and their need for secrecy 
(BANNON, 2003, p. 49). This option requires States to legislate accordingly to facilitate 
information disclosure. There are already many ONGs registering this data to the extent that 
some corporations are voluntarily reporting on “various aspects of their climate change and 
sustainability profile to one or more NGOs” (RHYNE, 2011, p.52). However, this option goes 
further, and requires official agencies to participate in date gathering proceedings and to 
share them globally.   
 Environmental and HHRRs standards. Transnational Corporations could be accused of 
environmental and HHRRs violations. The same capability to enjoy rights through its legal 
representation also opens the door to binding obligations. States could legislate to have 
corporations bonded by international HHRRs obligations. 
The advantage of implementing national legislation is that corporations would be regulated 
– at least at the local level. This will help achieve the environmental, social and economic goals in 
some way. However, efficiency goals won’t be achieved because of the lack of coordination among 
the different states where transnational corporations operate. If a dispute surges, different set of 
norms will require long and expensive legal procedures to avoid jurisdictional barriers. This means 
that difficulties coordinating different national regulations into a worldwide system would become a 
disadvantage. 
As for feasibility, we could champion initiatives to regulate corporate power in every country, 
but instead of having one political problem, we’ll be facing many different scenarios with their own 
complexities. It might be lumpy for some States to work the way into new legislative initiatives. 
Depending on how close the legal and executive branches are (and other internal political factors), it 
could result in political and operational implementation barriers.    
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6.3  IMPLEMENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL BINDING OBLIGATIONS  
A greater level of trust and compromise with the goals stated above, could result on an 
international instrument approval and ratification. This option would establish binding obligations for 
corporations at the international level - independently from States enacting local legislation to 
achieve implementation. For example, this regime could develop as the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) which is empower by the States members of United Nations. Acting as a Supranational 
Institution, the ICJ’s  actions are not linked or dependent on any particular State, but rely on the Court 
Statute’s authority. There are other examples at the regional level, such as the Inter-American Human 
Rights Court. 
In this sense, an international instrument could include certain parameters to be monitored 
by the UN to help thrust its enforcement. This option should include: 
 The creation of a specialized Court to address environmental and HHRRs crimes committed 
by transnational corporations. This Court could have the same kind of authority as the 
International Court of Justice or the International Criminal Court. As a matter of fact, 
discussions are being held on the issue of whether it should be a new Court, or if a reform to 
the Rome Statute should allow for the ICC to prosecute transnational corporations’ crimes, 
or at least his executives, who could be held personally accountable for the decisions they 
make – as long as they result in crimes against the environment and the local people.25 
 The creation of a specialized institution to provide corporations victims with logistical and 
legal support to address their claims. This office could also work as an International Registry 
Office for Transnational Corporation's activities, mapping conflicts worldwide and sharing 
the information with Governments and victims. An example of this kind of organization could 
be the World Intellectual Property Organization and the International Patent Office.   
 The establishment of an international bond. As shown by USA Environmental Protection 
Agency and CERCLA, a fund can be implemented to help address environmental problems 
when responsible parties fail to do so. An international binding Treaty on Corporate 
Responsibility could establish an international fund to solve corporate crimes. Funds will be 
provided by States, who are in the best position to recovered those amounts from 
corporations at their local jurisdictions. 
 The establishment of an international certification. Consumers and their preferences play a 
very important role in these days’ market. Corporations committed to HHRRs and high 
environmental standards can receive a certification to be known by consumers worldwide. 
Corporations (or entire States) could fail to achieve this certification, facing a competitive 
disadvantage market wise.  
6.4  M IX OF NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL OPTIONS :  THE MOST EFFECTIVE 
INTERNATIONAL B INDING TREATY ON CORPORATE L IABILITY  
This option relies on the previous ones, but recognizes a good probability of enhancing some 
success by mixing up some options. On the one hand, some national legislation is necessary under any 
                                                                
25 For further information about these initiatives see: http://stopecocide.nl/en/ and http://eradicatingecocide.com/  
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approach. Even an International Institution could render useless without the local agencies’ 
cooperation. On the other hand, international jurisdiction and coordination among stakeholders are 
necessary to avoid creating legal loops. The case between Chevron and Ecuadorian plaintiffs reflects 
the way corporations enjoy virtually unlimited resources and influence with governments. Under the 
right approach, an International Jurisdiction might be the only one capable of addressing -fairly- 
claims against ETCs. Therefore, a mixture of local-level legal implementation and direct international 
binding obligations has better chances to succeed in achieving the four goals, mainly because of the 
coordination attained after mixing different options.    
 Transparency and public access to information.  Information is key to success under any 
approach. Any court or institution can do little without the necessary data. Many resources 
are deployed just to access relevant information. As this information is required to address 
claims efficiently, transparency becomes a prerequisite to doing so. Several reporting venues 
can be considered: Carbon Disclosure Project, Global Report Initiative, The Corporate 
Register, and the Climate Register (RHYNE, 2011, p.52).  
 A specialized court/institution to address environmental and HHRRs crimes committed by 
ETCs in DCs.  As stated before, ETCs often enjoy high leverage on States decisions, which 
could cause national jurisdictions to be uncappable of fairly addressing claims against them. 
Corporations are less likely to influence an independent international institution.  
 The creation of a dedicated institution to provide the corporations’ victims with logistical and 
legal support. This tool will be the element that links all the other options. Assistance will 
provide the victims with the means they need to file their claims in the most efficient manner, 
helping to achieve the four goals. This international monitoring body, consisting only of civil 
society organizations, will have branches in each state to verify and investigate claims. (DEVA, 
2012). 
Another critical issue to consider is “the reliance on informal, non-legal tools and non-state 
institutions to ensure that companies comply with their human rights responsibilities” (DEVA, 2012, 
p. 200). These institutions, forums, and actors, can help enforce these obligations. Accordingly, this 
approach can be complemented using international certifications, which depends on NGOs and other 
organizations pushing forward to its implementation, but also could work under an international 
office’s direction, aiming to push States and corporations to join the stream.  
The information available to victims will allow the new regime to operate more efficiently. 
The victims’ concerns could be addressed more effectively by coordinating efforts among national 
agencies and a specialized international institution dedicated to providing corporations’ victims with 
logistical and legal support to address their claims. And finally, an International Environmental Court 
will close the cycle of enforcement of these new binding obligations. As the Court is entitled with 
jurisdictional power, judgments would become binding international commitments.  This would help 
to solve the obstacles in access to justice, described by Deva as “the principle of separate legal 
personality, the doctrine of forum non conveniens, the high cost of litigation, the large number of 
victims, and judicial delay” (DEVA, 2012, p.216)  
The establishment of an international bond could also work as an incentive for States to hold 
their corporations accountable, but it might also produce resistance to joining the treaty and 
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compromising any monetary resources. However, a competent Court will render this bond 
unnecessary because its decisions are more likely to be enforced. 
A disadvantage to this options is the necessity to obtain support, not only from as many states 
as possible, but especially from developed countries – where most corporations (and information) 
reside. The tools proposed require balanced efforts on the international and different domestic 
scenarios.  
The path dependency theory maintains that the decisions available now are the result of 
previous choices (LEVIN, CHASORE, 2012, p. 134), The four path model can be used to trigger durable 
coalitions of support, and could create long-term interests to participants. Locking-in policies could 
provide incentives for new stakeholders to participate. Therefore, this option aims to shape our 
future’s choices availability in a strategic manner: implementing small changes that become very 
difficult to reverse (such as statutory provisions regarding human rights and their enforcement); 
increasing the cost of going back to an irresponsible pattern of operations (because the cost will be 
palpably higher for developing countries); and, civil society can help to put pressure on governments 
that are not willing to engage on solutions for corporate irresponsibility. Moreover, shifts in 
consumers’ preferences can send a powerful message to corporations directly. 
7. CONCLUSION 
This article aimed to approach the problem of ETCs human rights violations in order to find 
the best mechanism to avoid or solve this issue. The approach came from a global perspective – 
because this is a global problem. Thus, international law seems to be the best way to tackle the 
problem from two necessary dimensions: enforcement of international binging obligations and the 
enactment of local legislation. International public law could require countries to produce legislation 
complying with international standards.  
This analysis is conclusive in supporting an International Binding Treaty as the best way to 
address the problem of ETCs causing environmental harm and committing HHRRs abuses in DC. Many 
experts and NGOs are gathering together to push an International Binding Treaty on Corporate 
Responsibility. Other people are instead occupied towards reforming the Rome Statute and/or 
including ecocide as a crime against humanity. However, because resources are limited, coordination 
and focus are needed. 
It’s acknowledge that international obligations arise from different sources, such as 
customary international law, transnational institutions, etc. Nevertheless, this paper is focused on 
obligations arising from International Treaties, as defined by the Vienna Convention on The Law of 
the Treaties (Article 2(1)(a)): "an international agreement concluded between States in written form 
and governed by international law.” 
According to Prof. Ruggie, the design of any system of corporate responsibility should rely on 
three pillars: “’Protect, Respect, Remedy’ to clarify the complementary roles of governments (public 
actors) and companies (private actors) in respect to the protection and realization of human rights. 
The first pillar of the framework concerns the State’s duty to protect citizens from human rights 
violations by private actors, such as companies. The second pillar regards the corporate responsibility 
to respect human rights. The third pillar is about the shared responsibility of States and companies to 
provide legal and non-legal remedies to victims of corporate (mis)conduct” (TINEKE, 2011, p.1).  
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This option’s efficacy can be measured using Deva’s ‘twin efficacy’ test, which states that 
regulatory initiatives seeking to impose and enforce HHRRs obligations “can secure their intended 
effects if they are able to: (a) encourage companies to comply with their human rights responsibilities, 
and (b) bring to justice those companies that are not so encouraged” (DEVA, 2012, p. 47).  
However, Corporate lobby power is well known for being effective. We can expect 
transnational corporations to use it to try to stop this international regime. As stated above, some 
States and the business sector are lobbying against a binding international framework. Thus, 
negotiations will face strong opposition from business representatives. To compensate for business 
pressure, public opinion and activism are important keys. Strong public support will allow States’ 
officials to resist business pressure – and can also affect business themselves. Therefore, two final 
recommendations can be made: pushing towards efforts in the same direction, and avoid the 
negotiations to be captured or coopted by corporate influences. 
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